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ABSTRACT 
System analysis for security and for safety are both focused on identifying potential 
accidents and attacks, to implement prevention strategies. Security system analysis aims to 
counter intentional acts that could make the system vulnerable. Systems-Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STPA) is a holistic approach to system safety analysis. In this paper, we explore the 
possibility to combine STPA analysis with Attack-Defence Trees (ADTrees) modeling to strengthen 
a system security analysis. We also discuss how the identification of the intentions and capabilities 
of the attackers could focus the priorities of the analysis and reduce its scope. We suggest an 
approach on how to combine ADTrees’ attack modelling and STPA to elicit unsecure control 
actions. To illustrate this approach, we apply it on a case study. 
. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
System security analysis and safety analysis have in common the identification of the 
circumstances that could threaten the functions of the system or its integrity. While safety is 
concerned with avoiding accidents, the analysis of the security system aims to prevent the system 
from suffering from intentional acts. In security analysis, this modeling of the intention of an 
attacker is carried out with the identification of security targets and, in combination with the 
mapping of the attack surface, helps to specify the defence of the system to be built. 
 
Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a hazard analysis technique based on 
Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) which structures the system analysis 
around the notion of control loops. Understanding how a control loop could malfunction or could fail 
to achieve its goal lead to identifying the system’s safety constraints. STAMP integrates the notion 
of causal factor to elicit these safety properties. Such modeling is intrinsically focused on the point 
of view of the system while a security analysis should include the attacker’s intention and 
capabilities. Because of its safety focus, STPA does not capture the attacker’s intention in the 
analysis. Gleaning such intentions could lead to the identification of system vulnerabilities that are 
more likely to be used in an attack scenario. As the system’s control loops are the core of STPA 
analysis, we propose to integrate their modeling of the system in the attack strategy modeling. 
Attack trees are an example of attack strategy modeling. Attack trees are a graphical 
representation for modeling and analysing potential attack strategies. They could be extended to 
consider defensive patterns in Attack-Defence Trees (ADTrees). 
  
In this paper, we explore the possibility of combining STPA analysis and ADTrees modeling 
to strengthen a system security analysis. STPA is a top-down approach to identify unsafe control 
actions from the control structure. Each element of the STPA control loops of a system could be 
the direct or indirect target of an attack. Deriving ADTrees is in itself a top-down analysis so we 
suggest guiding its refinement process with steps to make explicit the way an attack impacts a 
control loop. A bottom-up approach to security analysis starts by considering the system’s attack 
surface to evaluate how potential vulnerabilities could be exploited. We propose to integrate this 
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attack surface perspective in our approach to combine ADTrees and STPA. To complement the 
modeling of attack intentions, we suggest to include attack profiles in our ADTree modeling to 
describe the potential attacker in terms of its skills and motivation. Associating attack profiles with 
attack scenarios help to narrow the scope of an analysis. 
  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 gives background and related work on 
safety and security analysis approaches, Section 3 proposes an approach to integrate ADTrees 
with STPA, Section 4 applies the proposed approach to a case study of the steel plant, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
In this section we introduce the main background of our work, ADTrees and STPA. We then 
present some related works. 
 
Attack trees (Schneier, 1999) are a graphical representation of the potential scenarios of an 
attack as a tree of potential attack strategies. Attack trees aim to provide a way of thinking about 
the system exposure to attacks. The root node of an attack tree is the goal of the attacker.  The 
relationship between a parent node and its children nodes is following a logical structure called 
variance. Children nodes are either considered as conjunctions (AND) of actions that lead to the 
parent node state, or a disjunction (OR) of actions all resulting in the same parent node state. 
Attack trees have many flavours. Jhawar, Kordy, Mauw, Radomirović, & Trujillo-Rasua (2015) 
introduced the sequential conjunctive operator (SAND) that enforces an order in which the actions 
are to be conducted in the attack. Kordy, Mauw, Radomirović, & Schweitzer (2014) extended 
attack trees by considering defensive patterns in the so-called Attack Defence Trees (ADTrees). 
According to Kordy et al. (2014), original attack trees do not address the interactions between 
attacks scenario and the defences of the system. ADTrees contain defensive nodes called 
countermeasures. Those nodes could appear at any level on the tree and follow the logical 
structure AND and OR. Defensive nodes are system actions that are to prevent attack steps 
(Kordy et al., 2014). In ADTrees, a defensive node drawn as child or an attack node indicates that 
the attack is prevented by the defence. 
 
STPA is safety analysis approach based on STAMP. STPA’s approach focuses on 
accidental causes and safety constraints. STPA identifies the root of accidents which are 
hazardous scenarios to define safety constraints that need to be fulfilled by the system to prevent 
these accidents. It is top-down process to identify failure states of the system by analysing the 
controls of the system and how they can fail. This analysis leads to stating safety constraints the 
system must fulfil (Leveson & Thomas, 2013). STPA has four basic analysis steps. First, to define 
the purpose of the safety assessment, system losses and system hazards. Second, to identify the 
control actions of the system’s control model. Third, to establish the safety constraints and 
requirements from the identified unsafe control actions. Fourth, to identify causal scenarios. While 
STPA guides the analysis in identifying causal scenarios leading to failed control loop, it does not 
provide guidance for the identification of intentional causal scenario based. A security causal 
scenario is characterised for instance by the attacker’s intention, the attacker’s capabilities, the 
system’s surface of attacks. 
 
A number of ongoing researches are proposing to extend safety system analysis for security. 
We discuss some of these works as they relate to the approach we are discussing in this paper. 
 
STPA-Sec (Young & Leveson, 2013) aims at providing a solution to this security modeling 
need with a semi integrated approach between safety and security. It follows the STPA top-down 
approach but focuses on identifying losses and vulnerable states in order to strengthen the 
security of a system. STPA-Sec has the same basic process of STPA where vulnerabilities replace 
hazards. Even though STPA-Sec is an analysis approach for safety and security, it does not 
distinguish between intentional causal scenarios that are central to security analysis. 
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The Failure Mode Vulnerabilities and Effect analysis (FMVEA) is a step by step approach for 
investigating vulnerabilities-based failure mode and the potential effects these weaknesses could 
have in terms of decreased readability and availability of the system (Schmittner et al., 2014). It is 
an extension from The Failure Mode and Effect analysis (FMEA) used in safety to document the 
analysis of the impact of a component failure on the overall system. FMEVA proposes to include 
vulnerabilities and attack models to identify potential attack vectors of concern for the system. 
FMVEA uses cause effect chains into vulnerabilities, threat agents, threat modes, threat effects 
and attack probabilities in its modeling of attacks. 
 
STPA-SafeSec (Friedberg, McLaughlin, Smith, Laverty, & Sezer, 2016) is a fully integrated 
approach between combining safety analysis and security analysis. The authors explain that their 
approach goes beyond STPA-Sec as it provides guidance to evaluate the safety impact the 
constraints derived from the security analysis could have. STPA-SafeSec extends the core of 
STPA’s approach by considering security causal factors on integrity and availability. It claims to 
overcome limitations in STPA-Sec's approach by adding physical components layer into the 
control loop analysis to model the surface of attack and its link with the core safety features of the 
system. It also advocates for mapping security and safety constraints to the control layer in order 
to mitigate potential safety and security conflicts. 
 
S-cube were introduced as a joint safety and security analysis model for industrial control 
system (Kriaa, Bouissou, & Laarouchi, 2015). S-cube is enabling formal modeling for system 
architecture and automates the generation of attack and failure scenarios. The automation results 
are depending on assigned hypothesis. 
3. INTEGRATING ATTACK MODELING AND SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
 In this section, we will explain the proposed approach of the attack model for system 
security analysis. In section 3.1 we will present a brief on the proposed approach. In section 3.2, 
we explore to link the attackers’ intentions and their strategies with STPA control loops of the 
system. Section 3.3 relates the ADTrees analysis and the attack surface of the system. In Section 
3.4, we suggest extending this approach to using attack profile to focus the analysis of attack 
strategies. 
3.1. Integrating Attack Modeling to the STPA Process  
Attack modeling for system security analysis is an approach on top of STPA. Figure 1 
illustrates the attack modeling process. The approach extends STPA process with three main 
steps which are the identification of attack profiles, the identification of unsecure control actions 
and the refinement into attack strategies. The attack profiles are defined to focus the analysis on 
specific attacker’s capabilities. 
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Figure 1: Extension of STPA Process (Leveson & Thomas, 2013) with Attack Modeling 
 
3.2. Bridging STPA Control Loops and Attack Defence Trees 
 
In this section we explore how intention becomes action and how intention affects the STPA 
control loop. The difference between safety analysis and security analysis lies in the fact that the 
first does not consider the intention of an attacker. The attacker's intention and potential attack 
scenarios to accomplish the attacker’s goal could be modelled using ADTrees with the root and 
upper attack nodes of the tree representing the attacker’s intention and these nodes being 
decomposed further down the tree into specific attack steps. 
 
To combine STPA and ADTrees modeling for security analysis, we suggest structuring the 
attack modelling following this pattern. Taking one attacker’s aim as root of an ADTrees, we 
decompose it into more strategic intentions the attacker could envision to pursue the goal. We 
name this top part of the tree the Intention Tier. This part is composed only of attack nodes and is 
free of elements from the system’s modeling.  
 
From each resulting individual intention, we continue the ADTrees modelling by building 
subtrees which are now in the Control Tier. This step is done by considering the attacker’s 
intention faced with the STPA control loop of the system. The attack node is systematically 
decomposed into sub attack nodes targeting or tempering with each element of the STPA control 
loop. We name this refinement between single intention attack node and its control-loop specific 
attack sub-nodes a Tampering Chords as its aim is to identify how an intention could tamper with 
one element of the control loop and eventually resonate with the entirety of the control loop. This 
represents how the attacker could tamper with the system’s control and therefore trigger 
unsecured actions. Tampering Chords are the sets of connections between the Intention Tier and 
the Control Tier. 
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Different strategies or phases of an attack are analysed with regards to the STPA control 
loops of the system in the Control Tier of the ADTree. In the Control Tier the description of attack 
scenarios remains high level. The attack and defence nodes at the Control Tier are associated with 
an STPA control loop. Tampering Chords are the connections between the nodes in the Intention 
Tier and the Control Tier, they are the bridges to translating the attacker’s intentions into specific 
disruptions to the system’s STPA control loops. Tampering Chords are the key to establishing 
unsecure control actions triggered by the attacker’s actions that need to be prevented. 
 
The generic STPA control loop consists of four main elements which are Controller, Actuator, 
Controlled process and Sensor. The control model presented in STPA is meant to define unsafe 
control action for the controller and the control process. An attacker could tamper with any element 
of the control loop in a way that would trigger an unsecure control action by the system. Missing or 
inadequate actions in a control loop could be hazardous for the system. 
 
Suspected system behaviour could be expressed as an intentional system failure (triggered 
by an attacker’s action) and non-intentional system failure. The STPA causal factors can provide 
the rationale for how non-intentional system failures can occur. These could be complemented by 
ADTrees to give the rational for how intentional system failures can occur. We can use security 
constrains as countermeasures for the attack scenarios. Defence nodes are a shortcut for 
establishing security requirements. 
3.3 Attack Surface and ADTrees 
Individual attack nodes within the Control Tier are related to an element of the STPA Control 
Loop. These individual attack nodes might have sub defence nodes which will correspond to 
security constraints. They could also be refined further into more concrete actions. This refinement 
should reach a point where the attacker is exploiting a vulnerability of a component of the system 
to start or continue its attack. Such concrete attack actions are leaves in the ADTree. These leaves 
represent the attack surface of the system. The way they are combined gives the dependency 
between components’ vulnerabilities. We name this part of the ADTree the Component Tier as it is 
closely related to the physical implementation of the system. Steps of concrete attacks in the 
Component Tier are combined to reach nodes of the Control Tier. By using these separate tiers, 
we distinguish the system surface of attack’s exploit and the deception of the intelligence of the 
system by attacking its control loops. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates how Tempering Chords seat at the boundary between Intention Tier and 
Control Tier, and how Components Tier refines the attack strategies by highlighting the attack 
surface vulnerabilities they exploit.   
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Figure 2: Tampering Chords and Ties of the ADTree Analysis 
 
 
3.4. Enhancing attack scenarios by attaching Attack Profile 
An Attack Profile is a way of expressing the attacker’s abilities. Inspired by attack 
characterisations in (Schmittner, Ma, & Smith, 2014), we define attack profile as being is 
composed of two mains categories: the attack agent and the attack mode. 
 
Attack agent is the abilities, knowledge and capabilities to attempt attack regardless of the 
intention. They could be categorised into script kiddie (attacker with a medium expertise, and he 
can apply self-learning material), blue hat (experience attacker who makes his attack with the 
purpose of showing his skills), black hat (experienced attacker who makes his attack for the 
purpose of terrorising, for money, for political ideals or religion motives) and elite hacker (expert 
designing and deploying their own tool to sell vulnerabilities that they discover in the black market). 
The capabilities of cyber-attacks are very high because the attackers have access to wide 
recourses and because such skills are related to intelligence. 
 
Attack mode could be malicious, denial of service, spoofing identities and publish tools. 
Malicious code can be defined as a piece of code that usually connects to another program and 
can cause the system to behave unpredictably. Each code is designed for different reasons. The 
activation time depends on the design, for example trojans, worms and viruses. Their propagation 
is variable. User interaction may not be required like with viruses. Denial of Service: it is intensive 
connection from a group which aims to block the service provider and cause network congestion 
which lead to service delays. Spoofing Identities: is defined as a process in which a single 
computer, email, or other account associated with the service or a computer receive is hijacked or 
stolen by hackers. It necessitates some technique like fishing or social engineering. 
 
Defining appropriate attack profiles and attaching attack profiles to ADTrees could help to 
focus the analysis by employing only capabilities related to the profile to narrow down the 
assessment. However, this approach should not prevent exploring wider attack profiles but helps 
to organise the analyses. 
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4. CASE STUDY 
4.1 Cyber Attack Steel mill in Germany 
The second known cyber-attack that resulted in a damage to physical systems concerned a 
German steel factory in December 2014. The Federal Office for Information Security announced 
the steel mill accident in their annual report without mentioning the name of the factory. 
Reportedly, the attackers used phishing email to gain access to the plant’s network and then gain 
access to the production mill‘s network. The malware, which redirected to a malicious website, was 
downloaded to the targeted computer from a trusted email. The attacker was able to cause system 
components failure. This had a specific impact on the shutdown of critical components, which led 
to the impossibility of stopping the blast furnace (Lee, Assante, & Conway, 2014). 
 
The steel mill was targeted with the intention to cause physical damage. The general 
network of the facility was hacked at the beginning of the attack. Then, the plant’s production 
network which contains the management software of the steel mill was penetrated. The attacker 
took control of the plant’s controlling system and succeeded in disabling the furnace’s safety 
settings which caused serious damage to the infrastructure. According to the report, the attacker 
had a good knowledge and experience of the system. Figure 3 shows the design of the blast 
furnace’s controlling system (Lee et al., 2014). The controlling system has a dashboard with 
several indicators such as the temperature of the furnace, its pressure, the water level in the tank. 
An operator has access to the dashboard and can require in an emergency the pumping of more 
water from the backup tank into the main tank or to stop hot blast and water bump. The computer 
of the controlling system controls the temperature of the furnace automatically by opening the blast 
furnace hot air valve and closing it. The cooling system is also controlled by the computer 
automatically using water pumps. The temperature in the furnace must be between 1500°C and 
2000°C in order to produce steel. 
 
 
Figure 3: Steel Mill Simple Design System 
  
  
255
Brought to you by | Heriot-Watt University
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/2/20 12:56 PM
 
4.2 STPA Analysis for Steel Mill Case Study 
The first step in STPA is to define the purpose of the analysis, the system boundary, and 
losses and hazards for the system (see below). 
 
Objective: to produce and sell steel 
Losses: 
L1- People die or injured in the steel mill. 
L2- Steel mill production is stopped. 
Hazards: 
H1- Furnace is overheated [L1, L2] 
H2- Furnace is unable to produce steel [L2] 
H3- Furnace is physically injuring people [L1] 
Safety constraints: 
SC-1 Furnace temperature must be operated within limits [H1,H2,H3] 
SC-1.1 Furnace temperature must not exceed 2000C [H1,H2,H3] 
SC-1.2 Furnace temperature must not get lower than 1500C [H2] 
 
The second step is to model the control structure. The analysis must identify the physical 
process and controllers, then define an unsafe control structure. Figure 4 shows the model of the 
control structure for the cooling mechanism, the heating of the furnace and their interactions. 
 
 
Figure 4: Steel Mill STPA Simple Control Loop 
The third step in STPA is to identify unsafe control actions from the control structure which is 
mainly to find the behaviour to be prevented. Table 1 gives the system’s unsafe control actions. 
Table 1: STPA Unsafe Control Actions 
 Not providing 
causes hazard 
Providing 
causes hazard 
Too early, too 
late, order 
Stopped too 
soon/Applied 
too long 
Open water 
pump  
UCA-1: Computer 
does not provide 
open water valve 
when hot air 
valve close 
 UCA-2: Computer 
provides open 
water pump more 
than X seconds 
after hot air open 
UCA-3: Computer 
stops providing 
open water pump 
too soon before 
the hot air valve 
fully open 
Close water 
pump 
 UCA-4: Computer 
provides close 
UCA-5: Computer 
provides close 
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water pump while 
hot air open 
[H1,2] 
water pump more 
than X seconds 
before hot air 
close 
Open hot air   UCA-6: Computer 
provides open hot 
air while water 
pump is closed 
[H1,2] 
UCA-7: Computer 
provides open hot 
air more than X 
seconds before 
water pumps 
open 
 
Close hot air UCA-8: Computer 
does not provide 
close hot air 
when water pump 
is closed 
 UCA-9: Computer 
provides close 
hot air more than 
X seconds after 
water pumps 
close 
UCA-10: 
Computer stops 
providing close 
hot air too soon 
before water 
pump is closed  
 
Therefore, we can establish safety constraints (see below) from these unsafe control actions. 
  
SC-1: The computer must not supply the open water valve when the hot air valve closes 
[UCA-1] 
SC-2: The computer must not supply the open water pump for more than X seconds after 
opening the hot air [UCA-2] 
SC-3: The computer must not supply the open water pump too early before fully opening 
[UCA-3] 
SC-4: The computer must not supply a closed water pump when hot air is open [UCA-4] 
SC-5: The computer must not supply the water pump closed more than X seconds before the 
hot air closes [UCA-3] 
SC-6: The computer must not supply open hot air while the water pump is closed [UCA-6] 
SC-7: The computer must not supply open hot air for more than X seconds before the water 
pumps open [UCA-6] 
SC-8: The computer must supply hot air nearby when the water pump is closed [UCA-8] 
SC-9: The computer must not supply hot air closed more than X seconds after the water 
pumps are closed [UCA-9] 
SC-10: The computer must not interrupt the supply of hot air nearby too soon before closing 
[UCA-10] 
 
The last step in STPA is to identify loss scenarios. This step is to explain how unsafe system 
behaviours could occur. For these scenarios, we consider multiple potential unsafe control actions. 
The updated model of Figure 5 includes the unsafe control action with the generic control diagram 
in blue. In Figure 6, the process model in red indicates what the controller believes. The process 
model for the water level indicates that the controller is to pump water from the reserve tank or use 
the backup pump when the water level is low. The temperature is normal. Thus, we need to 
redefine the process model in such a way that the computer should generate an alarm whenever 
the water level is getting low, helping the operator to send the command to stop the hot air or 
choose to do it manually. 
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Figure 5: STPA Control Loop with Process Model 
 
S-1: The operator did not recognize the rapid increase in the temperature indicator because 
the indicator showed normal status. 
S-2: The operator responses to the water level decreases by pumping more water into the 
cooling system and switching the backup pump. 
S-3: The rapid increase of the temperature leads to water leak; which results in more water 
being pumped to the cooling system; which results in the mixing of water and iron; 
which leads to the explosion. 
 
 
Figure 6: STPA Water Level Process Model 
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4.3 Steel Mill Attack Modeling  
In this section we use ADTrees to model potential attacks in relation with the STPA analysis. 
In this case study, the intention of the attack is to cause life losses or enormous physical damage. 
 
We build our ADTree, see Figure 7, following the steps of Section 3. The goal of the attacker 
is decomposed into intentions. Here, to simplify the tree, we showed a single intention. We then 
consider how this intention can tamper with the control loop of the system. We created three attack 
nodes as children of the intention attack node. These three nodes, which are unsecure control 
actions (USECA), could be later refined into specific attack sequences. In the example of Figure 7, 
the leftmost sub-tree corresponds to the successful attack described in the report. They exploited 
vulnerabilities in the networks and operating system (the sub-tree reaches elements of the attack 
surface). The rightmost sub-tree shows an example of a defence node. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: ADTrees Scenario with vulnerabilities dependencies 
 
The following USECAs correspond to the attack scenarios of Figure 7. 
USECA-1 Attacker manipulates temperature reading 
USECA-2 Attacker increases hot air in furnace 
USECA-3 Attacker prevents cooling 
 
For each USECA we could derive scenarios of attack from the ADTree, for instance the 
following scenario.  
USECA-1 
Components: Sensor 
Control action 1: Gain access to controlling system 
Control action 2: Gain access to general network 
Control action 3: Gain access to production network 
Control action 4: Run malware on controlling system 
 
The attack leaves of the tree correspond to the vulnerabilities of the system. Note that an 
attack scenario would exploit individual vulnerabilities. The scenarios of attack indicate how these 
exploits could be combined. Such scenarios are therefore building a set of vulnerability 
dependencies which map the attack surface of the system. 
 
The scenarios modelled with ADTrees can be refined using attack profiles. For instance, 
exploiting the networks and operating system vulnerabilities could well be done by attackers with 
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different levels of expertise (e.g. script kiddie or elite hacker) which will make steps in the attacks 
to be more or less likely to take place. Their intentions might also differ. Attaching these attack 
profiles to the ADTrees could focus the analysis by bringing additional realistic aspects to the 
scenarios of attack. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we explored the modeling of attack strategies together with control structure of 
STPA using ADTrees. This should facilitate the elicitation of vulnerabilities most likely to cause 
harm to the system, and to define attack countermeasures. We propose to guide the building of 
ADTrees by scrutinising the way attacker’s intention meet the control loops of the system. We also 
suggest using attack profiles to produce capability-focused attack scenarios. We applied this 
approach on a case study. We believe that this example shows the potential to help narrow down 
the attack scenarios modelled with the help of attack profiles. The connection between the STPA 
control loop and ADTrees elements offers a perspective in the design of modeling tools to 
establish unsafe actions in STPA, including the attacker’s intention. This work is still in progress. 
We are developing prototype modeling tools to evaluate the implementation and effectiveness to 
help assess in the security of complex systems. 
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